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THE POSTMODERN INFILTRATION OF 
LEGAL SCHOLARSIDP 
Arthur Austin* 
THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW. By Paul W. Kahn. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1999. Pp. ix, 169. $22. 
FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE. By James Boyd White. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1999. Pp. xi, 194. $39.50. 
INTRODUCTION 
For legal scholars it is the best of times. We are inundated by an 
eclectic range of writing that pushes the envelope from analysis and 
synthesis to the upper reaches of theory. Mainstream topics face 
fierce competition from fresh ideological visions, a variety of genres, 
and spirited criticism of the status quo. Young professors have access 
to a burgeoning variety of journals to circulate their ideas and advice 
while the mass media covets them as public intellectuals. 
There is a less sanguine mood; an increasingly vocal group of 
scholars complain that it is the worst of times and refer to the above 
paragraph as a proffer of proof. Eclecticism translates to postmodern 
relativism in law review drama that compares, unfavorably, male 
aloofness with the female nurturing instincts of "emotional logic"1 or 
presents highly charged agony experiences about birthing trauma.2 
Yale publishes photography as art-commentary and ramblings on 
popular culture.3 Law professors as storytellers use stream of con­
sciousness to circulate autobiographical tales of the racism and sexism 
of the callous, liberal, white male hierarchy.4 Instead of problem 
solving or providing counsel to judges and practitioners, law profes-
* Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law. B.S. 1958, University of Virginia; LL.B. 1963, Tulane. - Ed. 
1. See, e.g., Drucilla L. Cornell, The Dream Cure, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 87, 90 
(1991). 
2 See, e.g., Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag, Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Repro­
duction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 {1989). 
3. See Barbara Kruger, Art-Commentary, 97 YALE LJ. 1105 (1988); Symposium, Popu­
lar Legal Culture, 98 YALELJ. 1545 (1989). 
4. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). 
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sors write for the approval of their new peers in the humanities.5 
Professors Kahn and White reside in the last category. 
Ignoring the fracas and obsessed with self, professors gleefully 
keep churning out the unconnected fluff and more journals surface to 
absorb it, while critics seethe with frustration.6 Criticism has been en­
riched with two new insights - and challenges. James Boyd White7 of 
Michigan Law School seeks salvation in the use of the literary imagi­
nation to transform and elevate our vision of law. Paul W. Kahn8 of 
Yale Law School proffers an even more dramatic solution: stop the 
presses - scholar heal thyself. 
Legal scholars are, according to Kahn, like squirrels on a treadmill: 
they energetically run and run but never go anywhere. We don't know 
why the squirrels run, but Kahn knows what motivates legal scholars 
to engage the treadmill - it's the Holy Grail of reform. Why? Re­
form is always necessary. It presents the tempting challenge of an 
abyss - a bottomless pit of constant failure on a highway of flawed 
solutions, a road kill that attracts law professors like stink on dung 
(pp. 7-8). 
For Kahn, reform is the inevitable product of the interaction of 
reason and will. Reason guides the rule of law with rational restraint, 
analytical deliberation, and logical critique. "[W]e consent to law be­
cause it is reasonable" (p. 10). But reason is an empty gesture without 
popular will, which is necessary to convince the citizenry to consent to 
the wisdom of reason. Most of the time this is what in fact occurs, and 
the two effectively "work together to create an almost impregnable 
redoubt for the rule of law as our deepest cultural commitment" (p. 
13). There are, however, times where one of the institutions serves to 
rationalize deficiencies in the other. For example, the lack of popular 
support for a government regulation may be overcome by resort to 
reason, while the irrational may be tolerated by the consent of popular 
will (p. 13). 
As Kahn points out, the commitment to use reason to build popu­
lar will/consent prompts professors to dedicate careers to producing 
reform scholarship. Much of the scholarly focus is devoted to recon-
5. "Too many law professors are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject 
piques their interest, whether or not the subject merits scholarship, whether or not they have 
the scholarly skills to master it." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Le­
gal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992). 
6. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Susanna Sherry, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRurH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) ; Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically 
Correct Law Reviews, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1319 (1994) ;  Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politi­
cally Correct Law Review Articles, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 233 (1999) ; Anne M. Coughlin, 
Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performer in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1229 (1995). 
7. L. Hart Wright Professor of Law, Michigan Law School. 
8. Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities, Yale Law School. 
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citing reason and will in judicial review where courts use reason to de­
velop principles to "obtain the consent of the popular will" (p. 14). 
Likewise, the use of reason to critique existing laws always turns up 
glitches and friction, inviting suggestions of corrective reform. Kahn 
sums up the source of the scholarly motivation: "The rule of law ... is 
not merely rule under the existing law; it is this whole process of con­
tinuous reform" (p. 15). 
Juggling reason and will and a virulent addiction to reform scholar­
ship is not the only problem. Instead of functioning as true scholars 
with impartiality, law professors write as practitioners of reform. They 
imitate judges by writing article-briefs in the doctrinal form of judicial 
opinions. They seek to make law work. To Kahn, this reflects the 
"collapse" of a distinction between the scholar and the object of his 
study (p. 7). The scholar is in effect the judge manque. All article­
briefs follow the same plot: identify a defect in an opinion's reasoning, 
devise a rationale for reform, and write a new decision-article (p. 28). 
The inevitable result is a continuous process of classical doctrinalism.9 
It is not that Kahn completely condemns reform scholarship, but 
he does argue that an obsessive interest and disquietude with the topic 
diverts inquiry into more relevant areas and satisfactory results. Judge 
manque scholarship gives a misleading impression that judicial deci­
sions convey power. In reality, judges mainly speak to the practicali­
ties of achieving an end without ever defining that end. Even the 
Supreme Court cannot set an agenda for the ends of governance. 
Brown v. Board of Education,10 arguably the most important judicial 
decision in history, has had modest effects on society, race, and gov­
ernance (p. 132). Kahn's explanation: "They never had the power; 
they always lacked the will" (p. 133). 
Given the existence of a multitude of complex forces that impact 
and shape the compass and motivation of judicial power, scholars are 
wasting time seeking "right" answers when they aren't there or are 
mute. 11 Kahn's solution: shift the scholarly focus to new sources by 
9. P. 19. "[Doctrinal analysis] involves the careful reading and comparison of appellate 
opinions with a view to identifying ambiguities, exposing inconsistencies among cases and 
lines of cases, developing distinctions, reconciling holdings, and otherwise exercising the 
characteristic skills of legal analysis." Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal 
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1113 (1981). 
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
11. If we are confident that we are better off after the judicial pronouncement, this is only 
because we are already committed to a court-centered world in which we evaluate power by 
looking to the quality of authoritative decisions. If we believe that there are right answers 
under law and that law has a value in and of itself, then we will argue about the legally cor­
rect answers that the Court should reach. This is what most legal scholarship is about. But if 
judicial decisions do not translate into effective results in the larger political order, then legal 
correctness may not be much of a value. Getting the law right may not tell us much about 
the character of the political order. 
P. 135. 
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"looking at the legal imagination" (p. 135). Study the varied contin­
gencies and the context of law's culture, its indeterminacies, and influ­
ences on it from the "inheritance of remnants from antiquated belief 
systems, brought into a loose coherence by virtue of certain master 
conceptions- e.g., sovereignty, revolution, equality" (p. 137). 
THE CULTURAL WAR 
Kahn's crusade continues the law academy's paranoid relationship 
with scholarship. In distancing himself from the reason-will-reform 
paradigm, he implicitly acknowledges a sense of doubt as to whether 
law is worthy of serious scholarship. The effort to elevate the scholar 
above the "practice of law" states the source of the paranoia: the 
practice of law is a vocation - something like digging ditches or 
plumbing - and cannot support any attention other than descriptive 
survey, that is, an explication of what lawyers do, why they do it, and 
suggestions for improvement (reform). 
The scholarship paranoia can be traced to Langdell's admission of 
law as a vocation by his effort to create a science of law by sequencing 
cases to form the basis for the deductions of legal principles. "Law, 
considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines."1 2 
In objectifying law he rationalized the doctrinal method of scholarship 
that conforms to Kahn's paradigm - decisions are parsed and synthe­
sized to derive prescriptions to guide judges and lawyers. The objec­
tive is problem solving. 
The dominance of doctrinalism was assured when the law review 
network evolved to showcase faculty scholarship. As an editor for the 
Harvard Law Review, John Henry Wigmore said: "We knew that 
their pioneer work in legal education was not yet but ought to be well 
appreciated by the profession. We yearned to see the fruits of their 
scholarship in print."1 3 It opened up a unique system that ignores the 
discipline of peer review thereby depositing virtual control over sub­
stance and methodology in the author. 
The first major threat to doctrinalism came from the legal realists 
who questioned the credibility of the notion that "science" defines le­
gal analysis. Kahn detects realism's failure as a movement in its ad­
herence to the reason-will-reform paradigm, thereby remaining 
"firmly within the grip of legal practice" (p. 24). Once the realist 
threat dissipated, doctrinalism flourished, enabling faculty to reap fi-
12. Norman Redlich, The Common Law and the Case Method, 8 CARNEG. FOUND. 
BULL. 11 {1914) (quoting Langdell). 
13. John Henry Wiginore, The Recent Cases Department, 50 HARV. L. REV. 862, 862 
{1937) {emphasis removed). 
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nancial rewards and status from being perceived as producing a form 
of scientific analysis. 1 4  
In his zest to save legal scholarship from self-destruction, Kahn 
conveniently opts to ignore the cultural war that engulfed legal schol­
arship in the 1980s. When law school enrollment dramatically in­
creased in the early '80s, it signaled more than the brain drain about 
which Derek Bok complained.1 5 It provoked the hiring of a new group 
of young faculty who entered the academy with a new vision. They 
questioned, to the point of resentment, the rigidity and authoritarian­
ism of the system that produced them. The newcomers included femi­
nists who had their own score to settle. Not only did both groups 
share a desire for change, they also had more in common with their 
colleagues in the humanities than with the doctrinally oriented law 
school faculty. They became Tenured Radicals, and as Crits (Critical 
Legal Studies) and Fem Crits, they became instigators of a new cul­
ture. 
In the meantime, the postmodern revolution exploited its domi­
nance of the humanities to gain control of the university community. 
The quest for truth succumbed to relativism while emotion trumped 
objectivity as the interpretation of the text became a game of trans­
gressing and demystifying. Postmodern language never escapes from 
its duplicity and confusion. Led by Tenured Radicals, the once 
autonomous law schools joined the crusade of chaos. The values that 
defined the Langdellian paradigm of scientific analysis were swept 
away, leaving a dwindling group of liberal law professors, along with a 
few holdouts in the sciences, to stand guard as the last keepers of the 
old traditions. To make things worse, they had to fight off both 
Tenured Radicals and incoming students who had been conditioned to 
postmodernism in their undergraduate experiences. 
Although he recognizes Critical Legal Studies' hostility to the lib­
eral system, Kahn dismisses the Crits as failed reformers. They got 
too radical - "[s]uch radicalness makes this scholarship seem oddly 
naive" - and became irrelevant "because no one was listening" (p. 
29), thus minimizing their objectives and impact. He is correct on the 
failure issue, as Duncan Kennedy candidly admitted in 1995: "CLS is 
14. See ARTHUR AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: OUTSIDERS AND THE 
STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL EDUCATION 160-64 (1998) [hereinafter AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE 
STRIKES BACK]; Arthur Austin, Law Professor Salaries: The Deobjectification of Legal 
Scholarship by Tenured Radicals, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 243 (1999). 
15. Harvard University President Bok claimed that the "brain drain" into law schools is 
"a massive diversion of exceptional talent into pursuits that often add little to the growth of 
the economy, the pursuit of culture, the enhancement of the human spirit." Jethro K. 
Lieberman & Tom Goldstein, Why Have Lawyers Proliferated?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1986, 
atA27. 
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dead as a doornail."16 Crits made a practice of drawing attention to 
various problems but never followed up with solutions. As Professor 
Gordon observed, after an exercise in shoveling rhetorical smoke, 
Kennedy and his friends "zoom[ ed] off in their BMWs and Jaguars to 
continue their class struggle against hierarchy and privilege."17 The 
reason they failed at reform was simple - it was never their goal. But 
they did what they set out to do - wage an all-out cultural revolution 
against the liberal rule of law. 
It was the Crits who introduced postmodernism to the law acad­
emy with a tactic now commonly known as trashing. Communicated 
in a helter-skelter postmodern pitch, trashing is in-your-face jive and 
chatter used to ridicule and deconstruct liberal symbols and institu­
tions.18 Crits conducted a radical political campaign to break down the 
law academy's infrastructure of objectivity, neutrality, and rationality 
- and ultimately subvert the individualistic, biased rule of law. The 
liberal, constructed hierarchy would be replaced by egalitarian altru­
ism.19 
The Crit manifesto, Roll Over Beethoven,'2.o stands as one of the 
first - and most passionate - expressions of postmodern legal schol­
arship. Peter Gabel and Duncan Kennedy, two of the original Crits, 
engage in a Critspeak hip-hop session of ridicule, contempt, and radi­
cal chic. Kennedy praises the interspace of artifacts, gestures, histri­
onics, soap opera, pop culture, and "all that kind of stuff."21 Gabel 
opines: "That I think is indeterminate."22 The masters of crittrash are, 
however, coherent on one point. They criticize the reform efforts of 
liberals and feminists, labeling them hallucinates who co-opt them­
selves into "adopting the very consciousness they want to transform."23 
Their target is the State - "the state as a collective hallucination."24 
They complain about the reciprocity among people, unconnectedness, 
16. Hope Yen, As  HLS Mulls Its Mission, CLS Scholars Remain Quiet, HARV. L. REC., 
Dec. 1, 1995, at 2. 
17. James Gordon, Law Review and the Modem Mind, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 269 
(1991). 
18. "Take specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actu­
ally foolish ([tragi]-comic); and then look for some (external observer's) order (not a germ of 
truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we've exposed." Mark G. Kelman, 
Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 293 (1984). 
19. "Altruism enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to be merciful. It has roots in 
culture, in religion, ethics and art, that are as deep as those of individualism. (Love thy 
neighbor as thyself.)" Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1717 (1976). 
20. Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
21. Id. at 9. 
22 Id. at 53. 
23. Id. at 26. 
24. Id. at28. 
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and the State as an imaginary political community composed of a "se­
quence of images forming a kind of dream-like narrative that mystifies 
and idealizes the painful reality of immediate social experience - the 
real experience corroded by alienation and mutual distance."25 
Kahn also views the feminist movement as reformist and, like CLS, 
as "in thrall to the idea that reason and will are the double sources of 
the rule of law" (p. 24). There is no doubt that feminists talk a rights 
game, and it was the Crit's refusal to support their reform aspirations 
that led to a break between the groups - with the Crits the losers.26 
But that was before the postmodern vision had the opportunity to be­
come a major factor in revising feminist rhetoric. Equality by itself is 
not sufficient to root out the residual effects of patriarchy and the tyr­
anny of reason. What is needed, according to many contemporary 
feminists, is a postmodern worldview of reality as a mask for the unor­
dered and holistic solutions that come from feeling and empathy.27 
A postmodern dialect enables female legal scholars to produce 
shock trashing to discredit and break down the coherence of the con­
structed categories and classifications used by the dominant legal ide­
ology to oppress women. Fictional social constructions, like male, 
female, heterosexual, homosexual, and lesbian, in actuality blur into a 
continuum. In her controversial postmodern declaration, Mary Joe 
Frug described in graphic detail the female body existing in a state of 
constant terror, shocked the readers with the "F" and "C" words, 
while praising postmodernism for encouraging "wordplay that is often 
dazzlingly funny, smart, and irreverent. Things aren't just what they 
seem";28 that is, things aren't what they seem in a liberal, politically 
constructed, dominant culture. 
The most energetic opposition to the culture of reason comes from 
the "voice" movement. As females and people of color, writers in this 
tradition voice the unique and distinct perceptions and experiences of 
outsiders coping with liberal majoritarian law. Voice people challenge 
doctrinalism with a new paradigm; they use narratives, parodies, and 
parables to produce authentic and exclusive accounts of alienation and 
victimhood.29 
25. Id. at 35. 
26. See Robin West, Deconstructing the CLS-Fem Split, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 85 (1 986); 
AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK, supra note 14, at 92-93 . 
27. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) ; Symposium, Women in 
Legal Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1988) . 
28. Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1047 {1992). 
29. The dominant view is summed up by a critic of authenticity: "[The] voice of color is 
identified and synonymous with marginalized groups in our society whose marginal outsider 
status enables them to relate important stories - stories that cannot be sincerely told by 
their privileged majoritarian peers." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 
YALE L.J. 2007, 2038 {1991). 
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Voice comes to the table with formidable leverage. It is marketed 
as a Kuhnian paradigm change, a new genre of scholarship vetting 
race and gender. 30 The race and gender orientation tends to mute 
negative responses. Moreover, the biographical context of narrative 
stories makes them virtually immune to critical evaluation. 31 Negative 
criticism merely validates the authenticity of the author's description 
of victimization. "How can you respond critically? Tell a different 
story of your own?" 32 Finally, by converting truth into whatever the 
author decrees, storytelling introduces into legal scholarship a post­
modern self that defies consensus. 33 
While the voice medium delivers a message, it is not the message. 
The message of Critical Race Theory scholarship is that the. liberal, 
white, male rule of law and the system it maintains are corrupt. This 
system is an institution predicated on white supremacy, immune to re­
form, and destined for catastrophe. Derrick Bell uses the voice thesis 
in a parable about an economically besieged United States accepting 
an offer from aliens to exchange Blacks for gold and critical chemi­
cals. 34 In another Bell allegory, it takes an explosion killing all Black 
faculty and administration at Harvard to force an affirmative action 
hiring policy. 35 Even when the white system makes a concession, it 
will invariably tum out to be a trick to camouflage some new form of 
oppression. While Patricia Williams tells stories about persevering in 
a racist society, 36 Richard Delgado's narratives blame Western men-
30. See Arthur Austin, Evaluating Storytelling as a Type of Nontraditional Scholarship, 
74 NEB. L. REV. 479, 492-96 (1995). 
31. Indeed, some advocates of storytelling come close to suggesting that silence is the only 
permissible response to stories. Whites who sympathetically· attempt to analyze or even re­
count stories told by people of color are said to be guilty of misappropriating the storyteller's 
pain. For example, when a white woman at a CLS summer camp referred to a story told by 
a Native Canadian woman as an example to defend the us·e of personal experiences, the 
original storyteller protested: 'Did that woman intend to appropriate my pain for her own 
use, stealing my very existence, as so many other White, well-meaning, middle and upper 
class feminists have done?' 
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Nar­
ratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 851, n.233 (1993) (citations omitted). 
32. David Sexton, Radio Review: Should We Be Blind or Not, Prof?, LONDON 
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 2, 1997, at 31. 
33. See STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THEORIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY 10 (1989). 
34. "And just as the forced importation of those African ancestors had made the na­
tion's wealth and productivity possible, so their forced exodus saved the country from the 
need to pay the price of its greed-based excess." Derrick Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent 
Speculation on America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 400 (1990). 
35. See Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2382 (1989). 
36. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). 
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tality for unleashing "a ruthless, restless culture"37 that enslaves people 
of color. 
To Kahn, reform means superficial tinkering - revising process 
and procedure, courts expanding or contracting rights as professors 
gleefully and self-righteously chum out critique scholarship. While 
the Crits cravenly demurred from the revolution, the Tenured 
Radicals of feminism and the voice people participated in rights advo­
cacy, but only as a support tactic for their main objective - a para­
digm change from the liberal culture of reason and rationality to the 
indeterminacy of the postmodern culture. Like Kahn, they seek a new 
culture. Unlike Kahn, they are in the process of achieving their goal. 
KAHN AS A POSTMODERNIST 
Kahn's evasion of the postmodern paradigm change challenge is 
explained when he outlines his cultural study of law. His creation of 
what I call the Ideal Legal Scholar avoids contamination from the 
practice of law by engaging in a Socratic dialogue that enables him to 
temporarily suspend belief in law practice. By transcending "every 
context" of the practice of law, the scholar is free "to examine the 
conditions of belief that make possible our ordinary activities and 
norms" (p. 33), enabling him to discover postmodern insights: imagi­
nation prevails over reason, law is always contingent, 38 avoid making 
normative judgments, and seek out self so "[w]e can know more about 
ourselves" (p. 40). 
As the central nervous system of certainty, truth is anathema to 
postmodernism. 39 In assuming that truth interferes with the work of 
the Ideal Scholar in his cultural inquiry, Kahn implicitly endorses 
postmodernism. To the Ideal Scholar, truth is inevitably qualified and 
contested, existing as an attitude or the product of imagination. "Like 
every constructed world, the critical world exists only as long as we 
imagine it" (p. 40). 
A rejection of truth and certainty does not inhibit Kahn from giv­
ing the Ideal Scholar a detailed macromap for the cultural survey. The 
map calls for the use of what Kahn calls "genealogy" and "architec-
37. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357, 1370 (1992) (book 
review). 
38. "Understanding the constructed character of the rule of law allows us to see its con­
tingent character and to understand that law's claim upon us is not a product of law's truth 
but of our own imagination - our imagining its meanings and our failure to imagine alterna­
tives." P. 39. 
39. What is striking is precisely the degree of consensus in postmodernist discourse that 
there is no longer any possibility of consensus, the authoritative announcements of the dis­
appearance of final authority and the promotion and recirculation of a total and comprehen­
sive narrative of a cultural condition in which totality is no longer thinkable. 
CONNOR, supra note 33, at 10. 
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ture" to uncover a "legal aesthetic" (pp. 40-41). Genealogy traces the 
remnants - implications - of cultural transitions, to etch out a narra­
tive of beliefs. Architecture relies on analogy to show that in law the 
past always exists in the present. "The point of legal interpretation is 
always to recover, i.e., to make present, something that appears al­
ready to exist" (p. 52). Unlike science, in which progress destroys the 
past, in law nothing is ever displaced. "All law remains available at 
every moment" (p. 54). 
By giving the past continuity, Kahn compels the Ideal Scholar to 
consider the consequences of relevant transitions, especially those as­
sociated with religion and revolution. Pass a law, lock someone in jail, 
or write a brief, and it resonates with the authority of Moses descend­
ing from the Mount with God's law. Law "is simultaneously a product 
and a continuing representation of the divine origins of the commu­
nity" (p. 47). Revolution breaks out, law ends, but "[w]ithout revolu­
tion, law does not begin" (p. 69), as each validates the other. 
Pondering the indeterminacy of religion and conjecturing over the 
remnants of political transitions provide the perfect pursuit for the 
postmodern scholar. Law as imagination and fiction have a 
Derridaian bite that resonates in the gamesmanship ploys of the fac­
ulty lounge. But Kahn leaves postmodern abstractions to micro­
manage and in the process puts his Ideal Scholar in an awkward bind. 
According to Kahn, every institution can make representation 
claims, often leading to multiple or competing claims. For example, 
both judge and jury can claim to represent the popular sovereign, 
forcing what Kahn calls a "contest" with enormous implications. If 
the jury is speaking for the people as representative of the popular 
sovereign, jury nullification would "appear permissible because it is 
understood as a direct action by the people" (p. 80). But if it is the 
court that can claim sovereign representation, nullification would con­
stitute an inappropriate usurpation of power. "The judge can claim to 
know the law and, through law, to know the sovereign people better 
than any accidental collection of persons on a jury" (p. 80). 
At this point the Ideal Scholar faces a dilemma. Bound by Kahn's 
ukase to avoid the trenches of reform, the Scholar's work is at an end. 
He has identified the intersection between the institutions and the 
competing representation claims but can do no more than note their 
contingent existence; he cannot, as a postmodernist, make a judgment 
on a "correct" claim of representation, but instead, he "explores the 
multiple possibilities of representational claims" (p. 78). Here is the 
dilemma. Stopping at this point is a counterintuitive inhibition for se­
rious scholars: it cuts against the moral obligation, inherent in the 
scholarly ethic, to carry inquiry to a conclusion - whatever the conse­
quences. Ironically, Kahn illustrates the dilemma by being unable to 
refrain from making a judgment: while jury nullification is generally 
"flawed justice," it may be appropriate in certain situations, such as 
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charges of euthanasia (p. 81). Kahn's relativistic cultural analysis col­
lapses. 
The explanation for Kahn's vigorous stand for cultural scholarship 
comes in four "methodological rules" whose intent is to render practi­
cal scholarship either superfluous or officious. The rules come in two 
strands: first, every meaning in law is contingent. Even the source of 
power, the judge, exists as a contingency- either as a suppressed self 
in which he conveys a rule of law image, or, in the alternative, sup­
pressing the law image to become a political figure (e.g. Chief Justice 
Earl Warren) (p .. 101.). In law, progress is a myth, and there are no 
successes or failures, resulting in persistent competition among mean­
ings. Reform under these conditions is thus a meaningless ephem­
eron. "In the absence of a hierarchy of norms, no program of reform 
can silence alternatives" (p. 104). 
Secondly, law is not "a failed form of something other than itself" 
(p. 92), and it is not something in transition. "[L]aw is a set of mean­
ings by which we live - and that is all that it is" (p. 102). Practical 
scholars like Richard Posner can effect a type of change that never 
impacts on the rule of law - which existed before and will exist after 
Posner's reform. Moreover, debates among practical scholars result in 
"balancing" and political compromises internal to the rule of law. The 
failure or success of the reform does not affect the nation's faith in 
law's rule, "which dates from the founding" (p. 105). 
Kahn says that he does not seek the demise of reform scholarship 
- instead he suggests the use of some restraint to tone down the 
rhetoric and expectations. Nor should the Ideal Scholar subvert the 
practical work of traditional scholarship (p. 137). These protestations 
cannot smokescreen his contempt for the practical scholar's waste of 
energy on unproductive goals. Arguing about the interplay of reason 
and will and how the authoritative sovereign should govern detours 
the practical scholar to spurious claims on the authority and power of 
the judiciary, wasting resources best devoted to "the character of the 
study of law" (p. 135). Kahn cautions that, while courts can tell us 
which side of the road to drive on, they do not have the authority to 
affect the vital factors of governance. "Courts can draw our attention 
to the aberrational, i.e., to remnants of social practices that we have 
otherwise abandoned, but they cannot make us other than we are" (p. 
130). Dedication to reform analysis hides the reality that courts have 
marginal effect on societal outcomes. 
Kahn's message is that writing about what should be done and ar­
guing over which Justice's opinion is "correct" may be a self-serving 
path to academic status but is a waste of time for discovering the im­
plications of legal culture. He wants the Ideal Scholar to follow the 
cultural inquiry to the source of "real power" that "inheres in our ex­
pectations and beliefs, in the institutional structures that we take for 
granted, and in countless, mundane daily choices" (p. 132). The objec-
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tive: redefine and reorient the character of the study of law by exam­
ining the legal imagination, a concept that covers the full range of ex­
periences such as the impact of sexuality and the implication of the 
body. "The cultural study of law investigates a way of life in all its di­
versity, not just those objects and practices positively labeled 'law' " 
(p. 125). 
Kahn leaves no doubt that it is a religious meaning that inspires the 
imagination of the Ideal Scholar. Even violence can be understood by 
reference to religion. To connect law and violence, one must under­
stand that sacrifice is an act of violence that transforms ideas into re­
ality. Kahn cites Abraham's sacrifice of his only son Isaac in exchange 
for a nation under law (p. 95). Where there is no divine response, sac­
rifice is meaningless violence. Kahn's cultural inquiry demonstrates 
that violence can best be understood as a meaningful factor in the le­
gal imagination - not as an act of failure or a mistake implying "that 
somehow we have a world that we did not intend to have" (p. 97). 
LAW AND LITERATURE 
"To understand the rule of law we must examine that which we 
imagine to be other than law" (Kahn, p. 120). 
"A cultural approach sees that all of law's texts, including those of 
the legal scholar, are works of fiction" (Kahn, p. 139). 
Kahn is preaching a version of postmodernism to a sympathetic 
audience of feminists, critical race people, and Tenured Radicals. He 
can also count on support from elements of the law and literature 
group. While Kahn correctly characterizes law and banana efforts 4 0  
(for example, law and psychology, sociology, economics, etc.) as "se­
curely within the practice of law, regardless of their letterhead" (p. 
26), the literature movement has diverse letterheads, along with an 
eclectic range of uses and effects, including Professor White's use of 
literature to postmodernize law. Using "good" literature to teach 
writing skills obviously comes under a law practice characterization 
called remedial education. We get a blurred letterhead from an ex­
atnination . of 
William Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust,41 which discloses multiple 
meanings on the intersection of race, violence, maturation, and law.4 2 
There is no blurring of meaning or intention, however, when Robin 
40. "Virtually all the leading law schools offer what detractors call 'law and banana 
courses' like 'Ethology of Law' at Yale, 'Rhetoric, Law, and Culture' at Michigan, 'Anthro­
pology of Law' at Columbia and 'Law and Economics' almost everywhere." Charles 
Rothfeld, What Do Law Schools Teach? Almost Anything, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1988, at BS. 
41. WILLIAM FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DUST (1948). 
42 See "The Law and Southern Literature" Symposium, 4 MISS. C, L. REV. 165 (1984). 
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West uses a Franz Kafka short story, A Hunger Artist,43 to trash Rich­
ard Posner's world of economic individualism. By selling admission to 
people to witness him starving to death, the Hunger Artist is the "ul­
timate Posnerian entrepreneur,"4 4 dedicated to the corrupting indi­
vidualism of a capitalist market economy. West interprets the story to 
depict a Posnerian system that "leaves all preferences satiated at every 
moment of autonomous choice"4 5 and refuses to intervene in social 
and economic dislocations. 
Posner disputes the accuracy of West's interpretation of Kafka,46 
thereby missing the point. It is not a matter of interpretative transla­
tion; West incorporates Kahn's notion of "other than law" and culture 
as "fiction" to derive a description of the oppressive effects of an eco­
nomic system driven to solve every problem - from adoption to vio­
lence - by resort to free market exchange. West's pretension thus 
demonstrates the affinity between Kahn's culture of imagination and 
the use of literature to explicate. While literature has always inter­
acted with law, it has generally been as background presence. Years 
ago, for example, it was common practice to provide incoming stu­
dents with a list of "recommended" literary icons that would present 
insights into the profession. In the postmodern era, law and literature 
has become a featured attraction.47 Teaching Virginia Wolfe, Dick 
Gregory, and Marcel Proust gave Tenured Radicals an opportunity to 
demonstrate disdain for objectivity, try new critical theories, and of­
fend the Kingsfields of the Academy. More literature courses were 
added to respond to demands for exposure to feminist work. What­
ever the motivating currents, the movement bears the imprint of 
James Boyd White, who got things going in The Legal Imagination 
(1973)48 and now sums up in From Expectation to Experience. 
Professor White has been conducting a cultural inquiry of his own, 
anticipating Kahn's scorn for "practical law" by vehemently rejecting 
the use of literature for vocational purposes. White's Ideal Reader 
43. FRANZ KAFKA, A Hunger Artist, in SELECTED STORIES OF FRANZ KAFKA 188 (Willa 
Muir & Edwin Muir eds., Random House 1952). 
44. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral 
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 393 (1985). 
45. Id. at 394. 
46. Posner's response: "It [A Hunger Artist] may be about many things. But only super­
ficially is it about hunger, poverty, the pitfalls of entrepreneurship, and the fickleness of con­
sumers." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 
180·81 (1988). 
47. In a 1993-94 survey of 199 law schools, 84 reported offering law and literature 
courses. Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, Law and Literature: Joining the Class Action, 29 
VAL. U. L. REV. 665, 666 (1995). 
48. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 311-14 (1973) [hereinafter WHITE, LEGAL 
IMAGINATION]. , 
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does not read literature to fact monger, to gain clues to character, or 
to learn methods of critical interpretation. Likewise, White rejects lit­
erature as constituting a road map to rhetorical flourishes and strata­
gems for getting an edge in litigation. Instead, the Ideal Reader en­
gages the text "to transform one's sense of language, of the mind, and 
of the world" (p. 56). The objective is to exploit the power of reading 
in a performance that enables us to recognize experiences beyond self. 
What the habitual reading of literature offers, then, is not a set of propo­
sitions or a method leading to a set of results, but the experience of di­
recting one's attention to a plane or dimension of reality that is noJ1l1ally 
difficult or impossible to focus upon, namely the ethical and linguistic 
plane, where we remake in our texts both our languages and ourselves. 
To the literary mind language is not simply transparent, a way of talking 
about objects or concepts in the world, but is itself a part of the world; 
language is not simply an instrument that "I" use in communicating ideas 
to "you" but a way in which I am, or make myself, in relation to you. [p. 
71] 
Kahn wants to rehabilitate the legal scholar through imagination of 
self and other in conceiving the rule of law; White wants to rehabili­
tate the law student through exposure to the literary imagination, ul­
timately transforming the student into an Ideal Reader with the in­
stincts of an Ideal Scholar. He begins by having students examine 
nonlegal texts to identify voices and discourse that legal expressions 
omit. The next step is to learn - and appreciate - how nonlegal 
authors transform language. Then comes a critical internal dialogue; a 
student is ordered to conjure up an experience such as the death of a 
friend, the character of another person, regulation of conduct, and 
"think" about it, first as a lawyer, and then "in some other way avail­
able to her, as she might do in the rest of life" (p. 74). In the ensuing 
dialogue, a comparison emerges in which the law discourse comes 
across as artificial, lifeless, and packed with objectified, analytical ri­
gidity. 
White initially assumed that the comparison would compel the 
student to begin to doubt his choice of law as a career and, as a coun­
ter, to develop a creative alternative to the law voice. That is not what 
happened - instead students relied on the voice they had successfully 
used in undergraduate school, a voice as vacuous as lawspeak. The re­
sult is frustration: "[T]he student finds himself using two voices, both 
of which are unsatisfactory to him" (p. 75). 
The remedy for this face-off is literary imagination. Using the en­
ergy from literature, students learn to speak in a new voice that en­
ables them to produce more inspired law work as well as discoursing 
in a personal voice of their own. They become Ideal Readers. The 
power of nonlegal voices informs the student, "establishing possibili­
ties to admire, or in some cases deplore, that may help us investigate 
how this life can be led well" (p. 78). 
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White describes a postmodern version of basic training: take 
young, na'ive recruits, pound into their pliable psyches how futile their 
pitiable existence as civilians was, then inculcate them with the combat 
techniques of a more fulfilling life. Like my old top sergeant who 
opened up every day by looking me up and down before advising me 
that "if that's ed-a-cation, I don't want none of it" (he was the best 
professor I've ever had), White seeks to convince law students that 
lawspeak is unworthy, stunted, and that they are in need of redemp­
tion through literature. Darkness at Noon49 comes to law school. 
In a typical drill session from The Legal Imagination, White orders 
the student recruits to read an excerpt from The Education of Henry 
Adams,50 reminds them of Joseph Conrad's quitting the sea to become 
a writer - "Why on earth did he do so . . .  ?," asks a series of ques­
tions, orders them to "express the real you," "[t]hink now of your rela­
tions with others," "[c]onsider what you do when a friend suffers,"5 1 
and on and on. The message is clear: develop a voice of empathy and 
compassion or remain condemned to lawspeak. 
Even in the congenial milieu of a writer's workshop or the speciali­
zation of an English major, the conversion White seeks is problematic. 
Acquiring the temperament or self that he envisions involves a per­
sonal journey, demanding serious maturation and considerable sacri­
fice. As an undergraduate I took over thirty hours of lit courses and 
never encountered the type of highly programmed badgering that 
White throws at his students. I experienced passion rather then pro­
gramming. If I accessed a new voice, it did not come from classroom 
badgering but from the opportunity to hear William Faulkner discuss 
the creative process. 5 2  He was "a tricky man, not above playing, how­
ever courteously, with his audience,"5 3 but he was open to the creative 
process. There is another problem: White eschews the use of litera­
ture to teach style yet promotes a drill program force-feeding students 
with demands for copious drafts, conveying the message that style is in 
fact the objective - why else engage in the ennui of drafting exer­
cises? 
49. ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (Daphne Hardy trans., MacMillan Co. 
1941) {1940). 
50. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
(Houghton Mifflin Sentry ed., 8th prtg. 1961) (1918). 
51. WHITE, LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 48, at 311-14. 
52 See FAULKNER IN THE UNIVERSITY: CLASS CONFERENCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 
VIRGINIA (Frederick L. Gwynn & Joseph L. Blotner eds., 1959). 
53. See Douglas Day, Introduction to FAULKNER IN THE UNIVERSITY xi {Frederick L. 
Gwynn & Joseph L. Blotner eds., 1959). 
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POSNER V. WHITE: PARADISE LOST- OR GAINED? 
The harshest criticism of White's work comes from Judge Richard 
Posner, who first raised the issue of relevance in a law review article s4 
followed by a book.ss He rejects the assumption that literature can 
furnish unique insights into law or that lawyers, as lawyers, can con­
tribute to the understanding of literature. Literature may reference 
law, but law is not the central story. "There are better places to learn 
about law than novels .... "s6 Moreover, White's literary musing re­
flects nonlegal interest and training, not legal skills. .Posner debunks 
what he calls the "great false hope": that literature can inform lawyers 
about interpretative knowledge, which can help in extracting meaning 
from text. To Posner, the great false hope masks a post-structuralist 
ploy that would equate legal interpretation with a system of literary 
interpretation that replaces the author's authority over meaning with 
the authority of reader-critics. "[T]he readers have now overthrown 
the bosses and installed themselves in power."s7 Without the direction 
of the author's intention, reader-critics have total control over mean­
ing, leading to a system where there can be as many "correct" inter­
pretations as reader-critics. Posner's distinction is that literary people 
can get away with poetic license but not judges who have the respon­
sibility to impose their will on the public. Posner concludes: "the 
functions of legislation and literature are so different, and the objec­
tives of the readers of these two different sorts of mental product so 
divergent, that the principles and approaches developed for the one 
have no useful application to the other."ss 
If literary imagination becomes the springboard for legal interpre­
tation, it is Paradise Lost for Posner and his liberal colleagues. His 
1986 article described an interpretative attitude that defined the then 
dominant liberal tradition.s9 If he had put his ear to the railroad 
tracks, he would have heard ominous vibrations. Postmodernism was 
beginning to filter into the law academy, filling a leadership void left 
by disconnected and aloof liberals who were blind to, or intimidated 
by, the aggressive tactics of Tenured Radicals. The Radicals consti­
tute a group of people who, as the Yale Law School dean said, care 
more about the humanities than law.60 By the early 1990s the post-· 
54. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 
(1986). 
55. POSNER, supra note 46. 
56. Posner, supra note 54, at 1356. 
57. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 85 {1983). 
58. Posner, supra note 54, at 1374. 
59. See generally id. 
60. Former Dean Wellington was credited with the complaint that "law professors today 
are more concerned with intellectual currents among their colleagues in the arts and sciences 
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modem influence had infiltrated the American Association of Law 
Schools, which decreed "nontraditional" (read postmodern) scholar­
ship acceptable for promotion and tenure. 61 But give Posner credit for 
ferreting out what White and the postmodernist were after - the use 
of the literary imagination to distill objectivity and the Posnerian eco­
nomic model from law. 
Two years after Posner's book came out, White pounced like an 
offended Norman Mailer going after Gore Vidal. He started by can­
didly acknowledging, "I agree with virtually nothing that is said . . . . "62 
He accused Posner of a hidden agenda; what is offered as an examina­
tion of literature is in reality a Langdellian legal brief stacked with co­
ercive arguments and propositions that fail to "engage" (one of 
White's favorite words) the texts he seeks to explain. 63 Compiling 
facts and identifying issues, Posner treats texts as if they were legal 
precedent. He gets the ultimate put-down - he is an anti-intellectual 
who speaks in an academic-lawyer-economist voice that "prevents him 
from seeing in the texts he studies the most important part of their 
meaning."64 Posner is not an Ideal Reader. 
White's main criticism is that Posner suffers from an inability to 
"engage" - or connect - to text and that that is a deficiency that 
compels him to force the judgment that literature has nothing to say 
about extracting meaning from authoritative legal texts. 65 Othenvise 
he could divine the message that uncovering original intention is nei­
ther linear nor a function of marginal cost but comes from the use of 
the literary imagination - it is, in other words, an art. 6 6  From expec­
tation to experience, White invokes the translator's analogy: every 
textual translation adds something that was not in the original or omits 
something that was. To demonstrate how the translation process 
works, White has students translate "All men are created equal" into a 
and less concerned about law practice and the output of the bench." John C. Metaxas, Two 
Justices, Self-Congratulation Mark Harvard Anniversary Bash, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 22, 1986, at 
4. He subsequently wrote that they "do not venture outside the ivy-covered walls, scorn the 
practicing lawyer and his work . . .  and look for rewards only from within the universities." 
Harry Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 327, 329 (1987). 
61 . In making promotion and tenure decisions faculty are to avoid "prejudice against 
any particular methodology or perspective used in teaching or scholarship." Report of the 
AALS Special Committee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 477, 505 
(1992) . 
62. James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
2014, 2014 (1989) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 46). 
63. See id. at 2028. 
64. Id. at 2015. 
65. See id. at 2015 (noting that "Posner does not treat literature as literature . . . "); id. at 
2033 ("Posner tends to look right through the language of the texts he reads . . . . ");see also 
id. at2021-22. 
66. See id. at 2023. 
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foreign language of their choice. "The results are astonishing: in 
some languages, such as Korean or Chinese, my students report that 
the sentence they produce is simply incoherent or unintelligible" (p. 
85). 
The analogy is that the lawyer-artist, in reading the authoritative 
text to extract a meaning for application in a new context, will neces­
sarily add and omit.67 The ascertainment of a static and immutable 
original meaning is, under the translator's analogy, impossible and a 
dangerous assumption. This does not mean, as Posner argues, that the 
lawyer-artist is empowered with the unbridled discretion to pick 
meaning out of the air with Derridaian insouciance. The lawyer-artist 
is always restrained by an obligation of fidelity to the original text. 
"The lawyer is thus a kind of translator, a writer who necessarily re­
makes an original text but always under the obligation to do it jus­
tice. "68 
Postmodernism endorses language lacunae: obscurantism to mask 
substantive confusion or vacuity.69 Posner complained that he had dif­
ficulty following White's exhortative abstract discourse.70 Unques­
tionably White has an affinity for language lacunae - in part attribut­
able to the material in which he trades. He is essentially an English 
professor who crusades in the law academy and understandably lapses 
into rhetorical enrichment deemed fashionable in an English depart­
ment. Then too, like Kahn, he is a postmodernist, and that's how they 
talk. The problem for outsiders is cutting through the rhetorical 
stratagems to ascertain if there is a hidden agenda. 
White's translator analogy requires some serious cutting. He uses 
the analogy to demonstrate that intentionalism is a sham because 
original intent defies identification. While translation produces "a 
kind of relativism" (p. 84), White claims that it never dissolves into 
deconstruction. The "good lawyer" and the "good judge," who pro­
duce the ideal interpretation for a given context, can bypass the abyss 
of deconstruction (p. 85), where there is no fixed meaning of a text, 
67. See id. at 2021. 
68. Id. at 2022 (footnote omitted). 
69. Critic Raymond Tallis says: "clarity is the enemy of writers whose stylistic manner­
isms serve to cover over difficult theoretical problems by making [it] hard to pin down just 
what they are saying." Raymond Tallis, A Cure for Theorrhea, 3 CRITICAL REV. 7, 29 
(1989) (book review). John Ellis identifies another consequence of obscurantist terrorism -
it deflects criticism "so that familiar positions may not seem so familiar and otherwise obvi­
ously relevant scholarship may not seem so obviously relevant." JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST 
DECONSTRUCTION 142 (1989). 
70. See Posner, supra note 54, at 1392 ("[White's] writings on law and literature contain 
much on literature, but little on law beyond exhortation to lawyers and judges to be more 
sensitive, candid, empathetic, imaginative, and humane. The exhortation is timely and elo­
quent; but what exactly White envisages for law as a humanity I do not know. His most re­
cent effort to explain what he means is pitched at so high a level of abstraction that I have 
lost the thread of his discourse."). 
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except in the experience of the reader "and that experience is immedi­
ately compromised the moment you say something about it."71 
In a search for the ideal interpretation, how does the "good judge" 
overcome the relativism of the translator's analogy? Easy : he engages 
in "a perpetual negotiation between the self and the world, including 
other people" (p. 87), learns what they say or do, looks to other lan­
guages, values, and cultures, while comparing the judge's own lan­
guage with others. It is like reading an Alan Greenspan transcript; 
you know he is making a point, but you're not sure what it is. Like 
Greenspan usually does, White reveals the point at the end : "There 
are no right answers here, but a conversation all the terms of which 
are tentative or uncertain" (p. 87). Here is the hidden agenda : the 
"good judge" and the "good lawyer" are, in fact, contrary to White's 
assertions, engaging in deconstruction. Like Paul de Man, the "good 
judge" knows that language never escapes "from the duplicity, the 
confusion, the untruth that we take for granted in the everyday use of 
language. "72 
Professor Kahn tells us, "The power of irony extends everywhere" 
(p. 76), presumably even touching White, Paul de Man, and decon­
struction. White rejects deconstruction for going too far by denying 
the possibility of any meaning. 73 He exaggerates the range of decon­
struction; meaning exists but only for an instant, it is constantly de­
fined and refined, never finalized, and always subject to the trace of 
previous and subsequent words.74 For the literary critic there is a more 
compelling reason for staying away from deconstruction - it is de­
classe. Once the chic literary - and law 75 - fashion, it self-destructed 
from the excesses of Jacques Derrida, 7 6 the debacle of the Fish Bowl at 
Duke, 7 7  and the Paul de Man scandal.78 
71. STANLEY FISH, IS1HERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 65 {1980). 
72. PAUL DE MAN, Criticism and Crisis, in BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: EsSA YS IN THE 
RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM 3, 9 (1971 ). 
73. See White, supra note 62, at 2017 n.8. 
74. See Arthur Austin, A -Primer on Deem1:Jt111etio11's "Rhapsody of Word-Plays", 71 
N.C. L. REV. 201, 205-6 (1992). 
75. A state supreme court judge advertised for clerks who could apply "deconstruction­
ist textual theory to workers' compensation statutes and Article 9 of the U.C.C." David 
Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1991, at Al2. 
76. "[F]or readers with a lifetime to spare, there is also a 100-page essay by Jacques 
Derrida, dealing with a subject yet to be determined." WILLIAM E. CAIN, THE CRISIS IN 
CRITICISM: 1HEORY, LITERATURE, AND REFORM IN ENGLISH STUDIES 167 (1984). 
77. Stanley Fish transformed a mediocre English department into a national fashion 
plate by hiring stars in postmodern fields like deconstruction. It became the cutting-edge of 
literary criticism. After intense political infighting, it self-destructed. See David Yaffe, The 
Department that Fell to Earth, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 1999, at 24. 
78. Three years after his death, de Man was exposed as a Nazi collaborationist and 
propagandist, having published more than 170 anti-Semitic articles. See AUSTIN, supra note 
14, at 106-09. 
May 2000] Postmodern Infiltration 1523 
The irony is that the rumors of its demise put up a smokescreen for 
deconstruction's current revival under postmodernism. The aphro­
disiac high from telling Homer and Shakespeare what they meant 
proved too much as postmodernists searched for new ways to retain 
control of the text. And what better strategy than to use literature as a 
vehicle to showcase legal texts as vulnerable to the interpretative in­
clinations of the Ideal Reader? It reminds me of the time I heard 
William Faulkner tell a graduate English student - an Ideal Reader 
- who was badgering him about the character implications of Flem 
Snopes that, if that's what the student got out of Flem, that was O.K. 
with him.79 Faulkner was not about to get into an argument over what 
he - the author - meant to say about one of his creations. 
Both Kahn and White vehemently urge the absence of correct in­
terpretation - truth is invariably contingent, incorporating traces of 
the past and future. "The idea," White says, "is to undermine the as­
sumption that words 'have' meanings, and suggest instead that they 
have potential for. meanings of many kinds."80 White's translation 
analogy automatically generates static - meanings omitted or added 
- that renders interpretation problematic. The designation of a 
"good lawyer" and a "good judge" with commitments to "justice" is an 
open-ended invitation for context-dictated value judgement, and is 
subject to Posner's wrath for cutting "himself loose from moorings 
that are part of the fundamental design of American government."81 
EDWARDS VS. WIDTE 
First came the postmodernistic scholarship - then came the criti­
cal reaction. The most dramatic criticism came from Judge Harry T. 
Edwards of the D.C. Court of Appeals and former Michigan law pro­
fessor who got the academy's attention by charging that professors at 
elite schools were imitating the arts and sciences with rogue scholar­
ship.82 He labeled them ivy tower dilettantes who, as " 'impractical' 
scholars,"83 produce abstract theory unconnected to law. With a dedi­
cation to indeterminacy, Critical Legal Studies falls in the impractical 
category, while law and economics, with flights in abstraction, exem-
79. This was part of a conversation that I overheard in an English class at the University 
of Virginia in 1958. I like to think that Faulkner would have agreed with me that there is a 
lot of Flem in Bill Clinton. See Arthur Austin, From Flem Snopes to Bill Clinton Somehow 
We've Been Here Before, WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1998, Fair Comment, at 30. 
80. P. 79. White sounds like Stanley Fish: "The objectivity of the text is an illusion and 
moreover, a dangerous illusion, because it is so physically convincing." FISH, supra note 71, 
at 43. 
81. See Posner, supra note 54, at 1370. 
82. See Edwards, supra note 5. 
83. Id. at 35. 
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plifies the irrelevance of theory. As for law and literature, Edwards 
tosses it aside as making no practical contribution - it "simply de­
scribes certain texts."84 
With indignant flair, the Judge took the debate to a different 
venue; while Posner focused his criticisms on literature, Edwards in­
dicted the spread of the postmodern culture into legal education -
and even into practice. It was a venue that gave White an opportunity 
to reprint an article presenting a richer and more encompassing justifi­
cation for his literary imagination (pp. 43-51 ). 
According to White, scholarship is more complicated than 
Edwards's misleading dichotomy between the practical and the theo­
retical. White contends that everything starts with the law school mis­
sion, which should not teach task assigning, present "right" or 
"wrong" choices, or burden students with the acquisition of skills. The 
objective is expansion: learning one's mode of thought, engaging in 
self-criticism, and making choices "under conditions of radical uncer­
tainty" (p. 47). It is a matter of translating from other fields, testing 
the language of one field against that of another. The mission is to 
teach "responsibility for the operations of one's own mind" (p. 47). 
White thus "engages" Edwards by converting his complaint against 
scholar dilettantes into a cultural issue and responds by invoking the 
vision of the literary imagination. When Edwards complains about the 
lack of ethical training in the law academy,85 White blames it on a tun­
nel-vision devotion to teaching the practical skills of mechanical juris­
prudence (p. 45). The solution is cultural; ethics comes from the holis­
tic inspiration of the transformative effects of the literary imagination, 
which induces respect for others and for what lawyers and judges do. 
Law school should teach "responsibility for the operations of one's 
own mind, and for the judgments one reaches; responsibility to the law 
itself' (p. 47). 
The inclusive range of a holistic education is not unlimited and un­
conditional. While White would tolerate the participation of the social 
sciences, they embrace "tendencies of a different kind" (p. 51), that 
threaten the academy. Because of the seriousness of the threat -
which we can assume comes principally from Posner and the law and 
economics gang - he advocates a more vigorous defense against the 
"tendencies of a different kind" than is presently being displayed. "It 
is possible that the defense will fail, and law as we know it will disap­
pear, which I would regard as a tragedy beyond contemplation" (p. 
51). 
White thus uses the literary imagination to cast law and economics 
as a threat to convert legal education into a monster of objectivity, in-
84. Id. at 49. 
85. See id. at 38, 66-74. 
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dividualism, and efficiency. Posner and his Chicago coterie are con­
spiring to bring a Hunger Artist ethos to One L.86 Like Robin West, 
White sees a Kafka metamorphosis in every classroom, morphing stu­
dents into Ivan Boeskys.87 There is a threat, but it comes from the 
balkanization of legal education into a law versus banana squabble be­
tween the traditionalists and younger Tenured Radicals. Here is more 
of Kahn's ubiquitous irony: as proponents of banana disciplines, 
White and Posner are bound together in a common cause of survival. 
It was Posner as professor who broke the door down for the accep­
tance of bananas. While there had been modest cross-fertilization 
with the social sciences, the appearance of law and economics sparked 
a revolution. An article in the Wall Street Journal reported it as "the 
most important thing in legal education since the birth of Harvard 
Law School."88 As a progeny of the Chicago School of Economics, 
and with the sponsorship of the University of Chicago Law School, the 
movement overcame strong opposition to become a curricular fixture. 
The long-range consequence is that Posner and his zealous followers 
made all bananas respectable, prompting the New York Times to ask: 
What do Law Schools Teach? Almost Anything.89 
Edwards does not advocate the total exclusion of theory; rather he 
concedes that, in moderation, exposure to nonlaw fields could provide 
valuable insights. To him, the threat comes from volume; the weight 
of the banana invasion has converted the curriculum into a graduate 
school of social science and humanities.90 In a 1998 essay Peter H. 
Schuck of Yale Law School agreed with Edwards on the split between 
practice and education but discounted its effects. "It poses no serious 
problems ... and it can be reduced but never bridged completely, 
which in my view is fortunate for both sides."91 For support, he cites a 
study purporting to show no significant change in the quality and 
quantity of doctrinal scholarship from 1960 to 1985.92 
86. Scorr TuROW, ONE L (1977) (providing a diary of the author's first year at Harvard 
Law School). 
87. Boesky was a Wall Street takeover expert caught and sentenced for using inside in­
formation who reportedly said: "Greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good 
about yourself." See An Insider Goes Inside, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1987, at A22. 
88. Charles Barrett, A Movement Called "Law and Economics" Sways Legal Circles, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1 (quoting Bruce A. Ackerman). 
89. Rothfeld, supra note 40. 
90. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 35-41, 47-57. 
91. Peter H. Schuck, The Profession and the Professors, AM. LAWYER, July/August. 
1998, at 85, 86. 
92 See id. Schuck does not identify the study. I suspect it was Michael J. Saks et al., Is 
There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic 
Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996), 
that surveyed articles from 1960 to 1985. For a study demonstrating "that modem legal 
scholarship is losing touch with the practice of law," see Michael D. McClintock, The De-
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It is not that his data is flawed - it is simply dated and therefore 
irrelevant. An economist would call it a case of "creative destruction": 
it was not until the mid- to late 1980s that the postmodern movement 
tripped in with sufficient influence to "creatively" usurp control of the 
legal education market from the liberals. Roll Over Beethoven,93 the 
Crit manifesto, was published in 1984, and storytelling, the Critical 
Race trademark, got a jump Start in 1989 from a Michigan Law Review 
symposium,94 while the Harvard Law Review published Frug's post­
modern manifesto in 1992.95 Law school catalogues began to resemble 
an undergraduate course menu inspired and taught by an expanding 
collection of nonlaw doctorate faculty who came on board during the 
mid-eighties. Schuck notes that Yale has about 15 nonlaw Ph.Ds.96 
My school has dual appointments in history, medicine, economics, and 
political science. 
What happens when postmodern scholarship gets to the Promotion 
and Tenure Committee is a topic of some bewilderment. Rather than 
delaying nontraditional writing until they get tenure with obligatory 
doctrinal work, young faculty now want to get an early start on a 
postmodern career. There is a catch - how does the Committee pro­
ceed? What do they use for evaluative criteria? If they thought criti­
cal evaluation of doctrinal work was problematic, wait till they deal 
with narratives and other postmodern genres.97 Instead of trying to 
determine whether the article adds to the knowledge of the field, the 
evaluator can look for its transformative effects on the audience. The 
question is not whether the work solves a problem, but rather: Does it 
resonate? It is not the comprehensibility of the analysis and research 
but whether the author manifests a commitment to an oppressed 
group. The burden is on the evaluator "to discern the unifying threads 
of a nonlinear argument."98 Confronted with this formidable chal­
lenge, the prudent committee will opt to rely on "those they recognize 
as experts in the genre for theO assessment."99 
dining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 688 
(1998). 
93. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 20. 
94. Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2rJ/3 (1989). 
95. Frug, supra note 28. 
96. See Schuck, supra note 91, at 86. 
97. For a discussion of scholarship evaluation see Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure 
and "White Male" Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE LJ. 2065 
(1991); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, BO 
CAL. L. REV. 889 (1992). 
98. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1042 (1991). 
99. Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 683, 709 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
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The process could lead to some mean-spirited academic infighting 
when the full faculty gathers to make hiring and promotion decisions. 
The law core people - the liberals - can be expected to protect their 
turf from further erosion in a replay of Edwards versus White. To 
practical scholars, like Edwards, the inability to evaluate banana 
scholarship justifies rationing that participation in the academy.100 
Things could get worse when it is banana versus banana in a struggle 
for preference. The only criteria for comparison are in the subjective 
judgments of the respective proponents, opening up the prospect of ad 
hominem attacks or arguments over the comparable merits of teaching 
equilibrium theory, Billy Budd, or C. Wright Mills. 
"CONSCIOUSNESS III IS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF LOGIC, RATIONALITY, 
ANALYSIS, AND OF PRINCIPLES."101 
I first encountered postmodernism in 1970 in The Greening of 
America. Charles Reich, a young law professor, wrote it during en­
counters with students in the dining halls at Yale. In the style we now 
know as postmodern pomobabble,102 Reich exhorted the '70s youth to 
reject the liberal establishment, something he called the Corporate 
State, which he held responsible for the evils of technology, rational­
ity, meritocracy, and the hierarchical authority of education, creating 
the "worst of all possible worlds."103 The salvation was Consciousness 
III: a "way of life . . . . It is the energy of enthusiasm, of happiness, of 
hope."104 
Like Reich, Kahn and White are after the same Corporate State 
culprits. The law hierarchy uses the coercive authority of rationality 
to oppress the self by denying the presence of plurality, fragmentation, 
and indeterminacy. For Kahn, Consciousness III is the cultural in­
quiry which puts space between the Ideal Scholar and the logic of law. 
"The real stakes in scholarship are not over the reform of law, but the 
character of the scholar" (p. 137). 
When asked by an Ideal Reader to rate the living novelists, 
William Faulkner startled everyone by putting Tom Wolfe first -
followed by himself, Dos Passos, Hemingway, and Steinbeck. Why 
Wolfe? He explained that the ranking was based on "the splendor of 
our failure . . . .  he failed the best because he had tried the hardest, he 
100. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191, 2218 (1993) . 
101. CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 256 (1970) . 
102 See Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional 
"Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997). 
103. REICH, supra note 101, at 110. 
104. Id. at 234. 
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had taken the longest gambles, taken the longest shots."105 And so it is 
with Professor Kahn; his lofty aspirations are beyond anyone but Paul 
Kahn. 
On a practical level there are formidable barriers to Kahn's proj­
ect. Reform scholarship is what law academics do; it is their calling 
and their substance. We like writing about law; there is something for 
everyone - advocacy, thought pieces, problem solving, trashing for 
the mean spirited, and so on. Even shirkers like the reform model; 
when pressured by deans for a publication, they know they can easily 
turn off the heat with a quickie. There is, however, a more serious 
predicament: Just what is a cultural inquiry? Where does reform 
scholarship stop and the Ideal Scholar take over? "Genealogy," "ar­
chitecture," and "methodological rules" work for Kahn but are too 
rarefied for general consumption. It may be that Kahn is the first -
and last - Ideal Scholar. 
White includes law and economics as a coconspirator in the 
Corporate State, while exercising considerable hostility towards 
Posner, whom he accuses of treating language as "scientific and 
economic in character,"106 resulting in "lapses of taste and judgment"107 
in reading texts. White's From Expectation to Experience is the 
literary imagination tracking Reich's Consciousness Ill's praise of 
nonlinear thought, the "spontaneous" and "disconnected,"103 as the 
Ideal Reader looks for contingency and engagement in literature. 
As part of the postmodern movement, law and literature and 
White have bright futures. White knows how to push the right buttons 
and has an obvious affinity for building an interest in textual explora­
tion. Competing in a declining buyer's market, law schools seek to dif­
ferentiate their school from the competition. Offering nontraditional 
bananas has become the favorite product differentiation tactic, assur­
ing a fertile life for White and his literary imagination. 
105. FAULKNER IN THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 52, at 206. 
106. White, supra note 62, at 2015. 
107. Id. at 2027 n.40. 
108. REICH, supra note 101, at 257. 
